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Rights Forfeiture and Liability to Harm*  
 
 
 
 
I. Forfeiture theories of punishment and self-defence 
One of the most influential ideas invoked in the debate on the morality of harm is that by acting 
in certain ways we can forfeit some of the rights we possess. It would not be an exaggeration 
to say that this is the single most important idea invoked in the philosophical discussion of the 
morality of self-defence, and thus, indirectly, in a number of classic debates in moral and 
political philosophy that in one way or another heavily rely on the notion of self-defence (such 
as the morality of war and the morality of abortion). The most prominent account of self-
defence goes something along these lines: we all have rights that protect us from having 
intentional harm inflicted on us, but these rights are forfeited when we pose a threat to innocent 
parties, who can only defend themselves by inflicting intentional harm on us.1 When this is the 
case we became liable to defensive harm, which means that we lack a claim against being 
targeted as part of a defensive attack, and thus we are not wronged by being so targeted (Quong 
2012, McMahan 2009, Fabre 2009, Rodin 2008). 2  
                                                          
* Versions of this paper were presented at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, the 2014 AAP 
Conference in Canberra and at a workshop in Rogozonica organized by the Stockholm Centre for the Ethics of 
War and Peace. I thank the participants to these events as well as Kim Browlee, Antony Duff, Helen Frowe, Doug 
Husak, Gerald Lang, Seth Lazar, Chris Morris, Hille Paakkunainen, David Rodin, John Simmons, Neil Sinhababu, 
Annie Stilz, Nate Stout, Laura Valentini, Bas Van Der Vossen, Kit Wellman and Andrew Williams for helpful 
comments. Special thanks to Jeff McMahan and Victor Tadros for discussing the main ideas of the paper at length. 
Work on this article was conducted while I was a Visiting Fellow at the School of Philosophy of the Australian 
National University and then a Faculty Fellow at the Murphy Institute (Tulane). 
1 For a classic formulation of this view, see Thomson 1990 and 1991. Some require that in addition to posing a 
threat, we are morally culpable (Ferzan 2005, Rodin 2003, McMahan 1994), or at least morally responsible 
(McMahan 2009, Fabre 2009, Rodin 2008), for doing so. (We are morally responsible without being culpable for 
posing a threat if its existence can be traced back to our voluntary agency, in the sense that at the time of our 
action we could have reasonably foreseen its occurrence -or at least the risk of its occurrence- as a consequence 
of our action, despite the fact that we did not necessarily intend the threat to occur. See McMahan 2005). 
2 For the purposes of this paper the term “liability” should be understood as denoting moral liability, rather than 
legal liability.  
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 A similar story is often offered as a justification for liability to punishment. For 
example, W. D. Ross writes that  
“the offender, by violating the life or liberty or property of another, has 
lost his own right to have his life, liberty, or property respected, so that 
the state has no prima facie duty to spare him, as it has a prima facie 
duty to spare the innocent. It is morally at liberty to injure him as he has 
injured others, or to inflict any lesser injury on him, or to spare him, 
exactly as consideration both of the good of the community and of his 
own good requires. If, on the other hand, a man has respected the rights 
of others, there is a strong and distinctive objection to the state’s 
inflicting any penalty on him with a view to the good of the community 
or even to his own good” (Ross 1930, pp. 60-1).  
Although the idea of forfeiture is not as popular as a justification for liability to 
punishment as it is as a justification for liability to defensive harm, it has a long tradition that 
goes back at least to Locke, and it is still considered by some as the only plausible way to 
justify punishment. Prominent defenders of forfeiture-based accounts of punishment are Alvin 
Goldman (1979), Christopher Morris (1991) and Christopher Wellman (2012).3 
Those who criticize the forfeiture view normally focus on a number of specific 
objections that the view raises in the context of punishment as well as in the context of self-
defence. To mention but a few, the view is often criticised for its alleged implication that once 
the wrongdoers’ right not to be killed or not to be punished has been forfeited, we are at liberty 
to kill them or to punish them for any reason (or even for no reason). The view is also said to 
have the unpalatable implication that it is permissible to rape the rapists and torture the 
torturers, both in self-defence and as a form of punishment, given that rapists and torturers 
seem to have forfeited their rights not to be raped or tortured. Finally, as a justification of 
punishment, the idea of forfeiture has been criticised for opening the door to vigilantism. For 
                                                          
3 The notion of forfeiture plays a crucial role in a number of other debates, including those on restitution and 
compensation, as well as those relating to the conditions under which we can be said to lose particular legal 
privileges. However, in this paper I will focus exclusively on its role in justifying liability to punishment and self-
defence. 
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once wrongdoers have forfeited their right not to be punished, anyone seems to be at liberty to 
punish them.4 
All of these criticisms presuppose that the forfeiture theory does constitute a plausible 
candidate for the justification of liability to punishment or self-defence, but criticise the theory 
by pointing to specific problems that its adoption seems to generate. The aim of this paper, by 
contrast, is to raise a more fundamental objection which gives us reason to doubt that the notion 
of forfeiture can be used to justify liability to punishment or self-defence, even if we grant (as 
I will do here) that it can be defended from all of the objections mentioned above.5 I argue that 
the main problem with the forfeiture theory is not that the answer it offers to the questions of 
the justification of punishment and self-defence is inadequate in light of the problems that 
adopting this view generates; the problem is that the answer offered by the theory to these 
questions is either incomplete or redundant.  
I will suggest that any attempt to justify liability to punishment or self-defence by 
appealing to the notion of forfeiture will give rise to a dilemma. Theories that aim to provide a 
justification that relies exclusively on the notion of forfeiture are inevitably incomplete. This 
is because conceptually, the notion of forfeiture does not seem capable of doing significant 
justificatory work unless we invoke some other normative principle to give substance to it 
(Incompleteness Objection). But once we do employ some other principle to fill the notion of 
forfeiture with genuine justificatory content, the notion becomes redundant and can be 
dispensed with at the level of justification (Redundancy Objection). 
This is not to say that the language of forfeiture should be banned from the 
philosophical discourse on the justification of punishment or self-defence. I will suggest that 
the notion plays two valuable roles within this discourse: first, it performs an important 
heuristic function, in that it marks the difference between two distinct ways of justifying the 
infliction of harm; second, the notion works as an intermediate conclusion in justificatory 
arguments that ground liability to harm in suitably fundamental normative principles, thereby 
facilitating the discussion among those who disagree about how such fundamental normative 
principles are to be identified. These functions are by no means trivial, but they should not be 
confused with the justificatory role that is often attributed to forfeiture. 
                                                          
4 Classic formulations of these objections can be found in Thomson 1976, Warren Quinn 1985 and Rex Martin 
1993. Further objections are discussed in Wellman 2014 and 2012, Lang 2014, Boonin 2008, pp. 103-119, 
Lippke 2001. 
5 For recent attempts to defend the forfeiture view, see Wellman 2014 and 2012, Lang 2014, and Kershnar 2001. 
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This point is of significant importance not only as a matter of philosophical accuracy, 
but also practically. It is important to acknowledge that whenever we need to justify inflicting 
harm on others by way of punishment or self-defence, our argument will ultimately have to 
rely on some principle other than forfeiture. If we cannot support our claim that someone can 
be permissibly punished or harmed in self-defence by pointing at some more fundamental 
principle, we must recognize that we have failed to fully justify the permissibility of inflicting 
such harm. 
This is what defenders of forfeiture often deny. For example, Christopher Wellman, 
who has developed the most comprehensive forfeiture-based account of punishment (Wellman 
2009, 2012 and 2014), has recently argued that even if there are no underlying principles on 
which the forfeiture view can be said to rely, this is no problem because  
all arguments have to start somewhere, and given that there is no other 
considered conviction regarding punishment about which I am more 
confident ... [the idea that we forfeit our rights when we act in certain 
ways] seems like a good place to start. … Regarding those who deny 
that violating the rights of others alters the moral status of the 
wrongdoers …, I must concede that my arguments will have no 
purchase with them. I am relatively sanguine about this possibility, 
though, because every argument in this area will require assumptions 
with which others may potentially disagree, and it strikes me that very 
few will actually deny this particular premise" (Wellman 2012, pp. 376-
7).  
If the arguments of this paper are correct, this move is simply not available to defenders 
of forfeiture. The intuitions invoked by Wellman cannot perform the justificatory role that he 
suggests.  
I will proceed in four steps. The next section spells out the two horns of the dilemma I 
have described; section III outlines the role that forfeiture can play in the philosophical 
discussion on the justification of punishment and self-defence; section IV considers and rejects 
an objection to the argument offered in the paper; section V concludes. 
 
II. A Dilemma for the Forfeiture Theory 
We can assess the plausibility of forfeiture theories only once we have a clearer idea of how 
the notion of forfeiture is supposed to work. So let us start by spelling out what we mean when 
we say that the right not to be killed or the right not to be punished has been forfeited. For ease 
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of exposition, I will initially consider the notion in the context of self-defence. The results of 
my analysis will then be extended to criticise the forfeiture view of punishment as well.  
Consider the simple case in which Andy wrongfully attacks Beth and Beth can save her 
life only by killing Andy in self-defence. The challenge for the forfeiture view is to explain 
why Andy is liable to be killed by Beth in self-defence. The forfeiture view does this by 
pointing to the fact that, with his attack, Andy has forfeited his right not to be killed. As Judith 
Thomson puts it, “what makes it permissible for you to kill [wrongful attackers] is that they 
will otherwise violate your rights that they not kill you, and therefore lack rights that you not 
kill them” (Thomson 1991, p. 302). But what does it mean that by attacking Beth, Andy has 
forfeited this right?  
Before he attacks Beth, Andy has a right not to be killed. This right is what in 
Hohfeldian terms we would call a claim right, i.e. a right that correlates to a duty that Beth 
owes to Andy not to kill him (Hohfeld 1919). Thus, to say that Andy has a claim right that Beth 
does not kill him is to say that Beth has a duty not to kill Andy. What happens when Andy 
attacks Beth? Thomson writes that in this case Andy “divests himself of a claim against” Beth, 
and that this is why Beth now has a privilege (or liberty) to kill Andy.6 In her words, “it seems 
to follow from [Andy]’s acting as he does that if [Beth] can defend [herself] against [Andy]’s 
violation of [her] claim only by causing [Andy] harm, then [Beth] has a privilege as regards 
[Andy] of doing so” (Thomson 1990, pp. 361-2).7 
But why exactly should we think that Beth’s privilege to kill Andy follows form Andy’s 
attack? Notice that in Hohfeldian terms, having a privilege to φ simply means that we are not 
under a duty not to φ. Thus, saying that Beth has a privilege to kill Andy is simply saying that 
Beth is not under a duty not to kill Andy. But saying that Beth is not under a duty not to kill 
Andy is simply saying that Andy is liable to be killed by Beth.8 It now looks as if we have 
                                                          
6 When she talks of “claim”, Thomson means “claim right”, so the two expressions will be here used 
interchangeably. Notice also that Thomson discusses the right to defend others alongside the right of self-defence, 
and accounts for them along the same lines. For ease of exposition, I will focus only on self-defence but my 
arguments also apply to the justification for other-defence. 
7 The only changes made to the quote are the names of the characters in the example. 
8 The language of liability is potentially confusing in this paragraph because while within the Hohfeldian 
framework “liability” denotes the susceptibility to having one’s normative status changed, within the 
philosophical debates on the morality of harm, “liability” denotes the lack of a claim against being harmed (what 
Hohfeld would call a “no claim”). As I have mentioned (above, p. 1), for the purposes of this paper I will use 
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come full circle to the starting point, for Andy’s liability to be killed by Beth is precisely what 
we were supposed to justify.9  
To be sure, the claim that Andy is liable to be killed by Beth because he has forfeited 
his right not to be killed is informative, because it tells us that Beth’s liberty to kill Andy 
depends on the fact that Andy has divested himself of his right not to be killed (as opposed to, 
say never having had that right). But does this justify Andy’s liability if we do not know how 
he has come to divest himself of the right not to be killed? This seems doubtful. Andy’s liability 
will be justified only if there is a significant moral relationship between attacking someone and 
losing the right not to be killed. But nothing so far has been said about the existence of such a 
relationship. All we are told is that the reason why Andy has divested himself of the right not 
to be killed has something to do with the fact that he has attacked Beth, but what we need to 
know in order to assess whether Andy is liable to be killed is precisely what the relationship 
between his attack and his loss of the right not to be killed is. Absent such a story, no 
justification has been offered. At the very least, the forfeiture-based account of self-defence is 
thus seriously incomplete. 
The same objection can be raised against the forfeiture theory of punishment. Here the 
thought is that while we normally have a right not to be subjected to the hard treatment typical 
of punishment (which, depending on the circumstances, will cash out in terms of interference 
with our right to liberty, our right to property or our right to life), we can forfeit this right by 
wrongfully harming others (Goldman 1979, Morris 1991, Wellman 2012). As Warren Quinn 
puts it, the ‘conditionality [on which forfeiture relies] can be seen as a basic feature of the 
operation of natural moral law that provides an independently intelligible "clearing of the way" 
for retribution’ (Quinn 1985, p. 332). Unfortunately, this suggestion is subject to the same sort 
of problem afflicting the forfeiture account of self-defence. 
Suppose that Andy successfully kills Beth. The question we are interested in here is: 
“Why is Andy liable to be punished?” The answer offered by the forfeiture theory to this 
question is: “Because Andy has forfeited his right not to be punished.” But, how can saying 
that “Andy has forfeited his right not to be punished” provide a justification for his liability to 
being punished, if it is ultimately tantamount to saying that Andy now lacks a claim against 
being punished? Isn’t the fact that Andy lacks such claim precisely what we were trying to 
                                                          
“liability” in the second sense, since this is how the expression is regularly employed in the debates on the 
justification of punishment and self-defence. 
9 Gerald Lang also notices this problem (Lang 2014, pp. 51-5). I discuss his solution below, p. 9. 
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justify? Surely what we need to say in order to justify Andy’s criminal liability is why he lacks 
such claim. 
 Thomson seems aware that the idea of forfeiture is not sufficient to justify the right to 
act in self-defence, for she writes that  
for the aggression to make …[self-defense] permissible, the aggression 
has to make the aggressor lack claims, and we stand in need of an 
account of why it does. I think it an attractive idea that the answer is 
simply this: if the aggressor is not stopped he will violate a claim of the 
victim’s…. The fact that the aggressor will violate a claim of the 
victim’s if not stopped makes him lack a claim against the victim” 
(Thomson 1990, p. 369).10 
But notice that saying that “the fact that the aggressor will violate a claim of the victim’s 
if not stopped makes him lack a claim against the victim” does not yet explain why the fact that 
the aggressor is about to violate a claim of the victim makes him lack a claim not to be killed. 
And unless an explanation of this sort is offered, the notion of forfeiture will look irremediably 
mysterious.  
Philosophers working on punishment have paid more attention to this problem, and 
some of them have offered accounts of why wrongdoers lose their claim not to be treated in 
certain ways because of their conduct.11 For example, John Simmons suggests that the reason 
why wrongdoers lack a claim not to be punished is that it would be unfair to guarantee the same 
level of protection against interference to those who break the rules and to those who don’t 
(Simmons 1991). Christopher Morris, on the other hand, appeals to the idea that we are all 
bound by a set of norms that would emerge from the hypothetical bargain of suitably idealized 
rational agents, and that this bargain makes the enjoyment of our rights conditional on our 
being ready to respect the same rights in others. Thus, according to Morris, the notion of 
forfeiture has a contractualist foundation: the reason why wrongdoers lose their right not to be 
punished when they violate others’ rights is that this is part of a hypothetical agreement that 
they are bound by qua rational agents (Morris 1991). 
                                                          
10 The same answer is offered by Thomson in her later paper “Self-Defence” (Thomson 1991), despite the many 
revisions made in relation to other aspects of her theory. (For an interesting discussion of Thomson’s view, see 
Lang 2014, pp. 52-5.) 
11 For a recent attempt to explain why the right not to be killed is forfeited in cases of self-defence, see Rodin 
2011 and 2014. 
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Notice that although these accounts appeal to different notions, they have a similar 
structure. They both employ some independent normative principles to provide an explanation 
of why wrongdoers lose certain rights when they act in certain ways (as opposed to merely 
stating that wrongdoers lose these rights when they act in those ways). This is precisely what 
is needed in order to avoid the objection I have raised against Thomson. But while these 
accounts do successfully avoid the Incompleteness Objection, it is doubtful that they can rescue 
the forfeiture view. For once we invoke the idea of fairness or the idea of a hypothetical contract 
to explain why wrongdoers make themselves liable to punishment by violating the rights of 
their victims, the notion of forfeiture seems to become redundant. Forfeiture adds nothing to 
the justification of punishment or self-defence, because the justificatory work is now being 
done by these other notions.  
For example, if we accept Morris’ view, the reason why Andy is liable to being 
punished is that this is part of a hypothetical agreement that binds him qua rational agent – an 
agreement that, among other things, states that those who violate others’ rights may be 
subjected to certain kinds of hard treatment. Similarly, if we take Simmons’ view, the reason 
why Andy lacks a claim not to be punished is that granting the existence of such a claim would 
be unfair toward those who refrain from breaking the rules. Saying that Andy has forfeited his 
right not to be punished does not seem to add anything to either of the stories in terms of 
justificatory power. Indeed, as the brief formulations of Morris’ and Simmons’ views offered 
in this paragraph suggest, their theories could be formulated equally well without mentioning 
the idea of forfeiture at all.  
Thus, defenders of the forfeiture view are caught in a dilemma. If the notion of 
forfeiture is supposed to do independent normative work in justifying liability to punishment 
or self-defence, they end up with an argument that is inevitably incomplete. If, on the other 
hand, fairness or some other normative principle is invoked to give substance to the idea of 
forfeiture in the way suggested by Simmons or Morris, the notion of forfeiture becomes 
redundant. For the justificatory work the notion is supposed to do, will ultimately be done by 
the underlying normative principle used to give substance to it. Either way, the notion of 
forfeiture plays no role, or at least no significant role, in providing an answer to the justification 
of punishment or self-defence.12 
                                                          
12 As it will become clear, there are two ways in which the Incompleteness Objection might be interpreted: a 
weaker interpretation, which grants limited justificatory power to the notion of forfeiture, and a stronger one, 
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Defenders of the forfeiture view might be tempted to reply that all I have done is 
highlight a feature of their view that they already acknowledge, namely that their view cannot 
provide a self-standing justification for punishment or self-defence. After all, most defenders 
of forfeiture agree that having forfeited our right not to be punished or our right to not to be 
killed provides a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for punishment or self-defensive 
killing being justified (Morris 1991, p. 68; Goldman 1979, p. 44, 48; Uniacke 1994, pp. 190-
1.) We may not be permissibly punished or killed in self-defence unless we have forfeited these 
rights, but the mere fact that we have forfeited them does not automatically give others positive 
reasons to inflict harm on us by way of punishment or self-defence.13 Separate principles will 
have to be invoked to provide these reasons, such as deterrence or retribution in the case of 
punishment, or the fact that innocent lives will be saved in the case of self-defence.14 
This reply however, would miss the mark as my objection is not that the notion of 
forfeiture cannot by itself justify the infliction of punishment or self-defensive harm. Rather, 
the objection is that forfeiture by itself cannot justify liability to harm by way of punishment 
or self-defence. In other words, I’m happy to concede that saying that forfeiture justifies the 
permissibility of punishing or acting in self-defence against Andy (since Andy lacks a claim 
against being punished or killed in self-defence) is not yet saying that we are justified in 
punishing or acting in-self-defence against Andy, as we might lack positive reasons to do what 
would be permissible for us to do. But it is precisely the claim that forfeiture can justify the 
permissibility of inflicting harm on Andy by way of punishment or self-defence that is called 
into question by my objection. 
What about the reply that forfeiture is already understood, at least by some, as providing 
a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for liability to punishment or self-defensive killing? 
For example, while so called “externalists” about liability to defensive harm hold the view that 
one can be liable to defensive harm even if the infliction of that harm would be unnecessary 
(whether someone is liable for externalists only depends on whether the relevant right has been 
                                                          
which denies that the notion has any such power. In section III, I discuss these two interpretations and argue in 
favour of the latter.  
13 It is worth noticing that not all defenders of the forfeiture view agree. Kit Wellman (2012, pp. 374-376) and 
David Rodin (2003, pp. 71-77) argue that forfeiture should be understood as providing both a necessary and a 
sufficient condition for the justification of the permissibility of punishment and self-defensive killing respectively. 
14 This seems to be the strategy employed by Lang to neutralize the first horn of the dilemma (Lang 2014, pp. 54-
55).  
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forfeited),15 “internalists” claim that we can only be liable to harm that is necessary to avert a 
threat.16 Thus, for internalists, the fact that Andy has acted in whichever way is required to 
forfeit his right against being killed (say, he has wrongfully attacked Beth) is not sufficient to 
justify his liability to harm. Is my claim that forfeiture cannot provide a self-standing 
justification of self-defence simply a way of highlighting a feature of forfeiture that internalists 
already take for granted? 
It is not. Acknowledging that the forfeiture view only provides necessary, but not 
sufficient, conditions for liability to punishment or self-defence does nothing to neutralize my 
argument, because either way the Redundancy Objection applies. This is because the problem 
raised by the Redundancy Objection is not that the forfeiture view will have to work in tandem 
with a separate theory to provide a complete justification for liability to punishment or self-
defence. Rather, the problem is that whatever justificatory work the notion of forfeiture is 
supposed to be doing, be that providing necessary or necessary and sufficient conditions, will 
be ultimately done by the underlying principles which are employed to give substance to this 
notion (for example, fairness or the idea of moral contract).  
 
III. The Roles of Forfeiture  
I have argued that any account that aims to justify liability to punishment or self-defence by 
relying exclusively on the notion of forfeiture will be incomplete. This problem can be avoided 
by invoking some other theory to fill in the notion of forfeiture with genuine justificatory 
content i.e. to explain why wrongdoers lose certain rights when they act in certain ways, as 
opposed to merely stating that they lose these rights as a consequence of acting in those ways. 
But once we amend the forfeiture account in this way, and we employ a supplementary theory 
to answer the justificatory questions we are interested in, the notion of forfeiture seems to 
become redundant at the level of justification.  
This is not to say that the notion of forfeiture has no role to play in the philosophical 
debates on the justification of punishment and self-defence. In this section, I outline two related 
ways in which forfeiture is helpful in structuring these debates. To begin with, the notion of 
forfeiture performs an important heuristic function, in that it marks the difference between two 
distinct ways of justifying the permissibility of inflicting harm on others. The difference in 
                                                          
15 For a defense of this view, see Quong and Firth 2012. 
16 See for example, McMahan 2009, p. 9. For an illuminating discussion of the distinction between internalism 
and externalism, see, Frowe 2014, ch. 4. 
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question is the one between cases where we are permitted to harm someone despite the fact 
that she retains a right against being harmed and cases where we are permitted to harm someone 
in virtue of the fact that she has lost her right against being harmed.  
Consider the classic trolley case in which a trolley that is about to kill five people is 
diverted onto a side-track in which only one person will be killed. There is an important 
difference between the moral status of this person – call her Carla – and the moral status of 
someone like Andy, who is liable to be killed by Beth in self-defence. Carla retains a right not 
to be killed, but can be permissibly killed nonetheless because that right is justifiably 
overridden (as a lesser evil).17 Andy, by contrast, no longer has a right not to be killed and this 
is why it is permissible for Beth to kill him in self-defence. The reason why Andy may be killed 
is that he does not have the sort of normative protection that Carla has (and that he also had 
before attacking Beth).  
A valuable function performed by the notion of forfeiture is to mark the difference 
between Carla’s and Andy’s moral status. This difference matters greatly. Since Carla retains 
a right not to be killed, we should conclude that she is wronged even if killing her is permissible. 
And since she is wronged, some sort of apology or compensation might be owed to her family 
or her loved ones. Moreover, we would be required to bear greater costs to avoid her death, if 
we could, than we would in order to avoid Andy’s death. By contrast, since Andy lacks the 
right not to be killed, he is not wronged when he is killed. Thus, we are under no duty to 
apologise or provide compensation for his death (though we should certainly regret its 
occurrence), and we would be required to bear less costs to avoid his death, if we could do so, 
than we would to avoid Carla’s death.. In other words, engaging in permissible wrongful killing 
(i.e. the permissible killing of someone who is wronged by that killing) generates obligations 
that are not generated by permissible non-wrongful killing.18 
This confirms that, as we have seen already, forfeiture-based accounts of punishment 
and self-defence are genuinely informative. Saying that Andy has forfeited his right not to be 
killed does tell us something important about why we can permissibly act in self-defence 
against him. We should be clear, however, about what it tells us and what it doesn’t. Defenders 
                                                          
17 Most people seem to agree that the trolley can be turned in this case, but nothing hangs on this specific example. 
Those who disagree can replace it with any other scenario in which someone’s right not to be killed can be 
justifiably overridden by some other moral considerations. 
18 This view is standardly accepted among philosophers working on the morality of defensive harm. See for 
example, Frowe 2014, Bazargan 2014, Tadros 2012, Lazar 2012, McMahan 2009, Fabre 2009, Rodin 2003. 
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of the forfeiture view might be tempted to argue that to the extent that their theory performs 
the function I have just described, it does after all have some justificatory role to play. In other 
words, they might be happy to acknowledge the Incompleteness Objection, but point out that 
although forfeiture does not provide a full justification for liability to punishment or self-
defence, it nonetheless provides a partial one.  
According to this view, saying that someone has forfeited her right not to be punished 
or killed, does go some way toward justifying her liability to being punished or killed in self-
defence. Whilst a full justification will have to include an account of how wrongdoers divest 
themselves of the right not to be killed or the right not to be punished, knowing that wrongdoers 
have divested themselves of such rights is nonetheless a first step down the justificatory road.  
However, there is reason to doubt this approach. For saying that the notion of forfeiture 
plays a heuristic role in marking the difference between the two aforementioned ways to justify 
liability to harm, is not saying that the notion plays a justificatory role in explaining this 
difference. The latter claim seems implausible because, once again, the justificatory work in 
explaining the difference at hand will ultimately be done by whichever principle we choose to 
give substance to the notion of forfeiture.  
For example, we might argue that the reason why Andy lacks a right not to be killed in 
self-defence by Beth is that since he is morally responsible for posing a threat of unjust harm, 
he rather than Beth should be the one who suffers the consequences of the harm he has caused 
(McMahan 2009); or we might argue that by virtue of his wrongdoing, Andy has incurred an 
enforceable duty to protect Beth’s life at the cost of his (Tadros 2012); or that Andy and Beth 
are under a duty of reciprocity not to attack each other only insofar as they are not attacked 
(Rodin 2014). If we want to explain why the justification for harming Andy is different from 
the justification for harming Carla, we’ll have to tell one of these (or other similar) stories, and 
once we do, the notion of forfeiture will not add much to the picture in terms of justification. 
The notion of forfeiture rather works like a placeholder, whose main function is to signal that 
one of these justifications is available. 
To clarify this point, consider the way in which the related notion of waiver is used in 
discussions about the morality of harm. We normally say, for example, that boxers waive their 
rights not to be harmed in certain ways (or, more precisely, the right not to be exposed to the 
risk of being harmed in certain ways) by accepting to fight a match. In this case, however, it is 
obvious that the notion of waiver does no real work in justifying the permissibility for boxers 
to harm each other. This justificatory work is rather done by the notion of consent.  
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Ali can permissibly punch Joe because Joe consented to it. Saying that Joe has waived 
his right not to be punched does not add anything to this justification. What it does is simply 
point at the fact that the reason why Ali can permissibly punch Joe is of a certain type i.e. that 
his permission to punch Joe has something to do with the fact that Joe has given up his right 
not to be punched, as opposed to say, Ali being permitted to punch Joe despite Joe retaining a 
right against being punched or to Joe not having that right to begin with. What explains the fact 
that Joe has given up this right is consent. 
The notion of forfeiture works in the same way. We can plausibly use it only to the 
extent that there is some other normative principle that plays the same role played by consent 
in the example just discussed. In saying that someone has forfeited her right not to be punished 
or not to be killed in self-defence, we are pointing out that the permission to punish or kill this 
person in self-defence is of a certain type, i.e. that it depends on the fact that she lacks a 
complaint against our doing so. We are not explaining why the person we are acting against 
lacks such a complaint. If this is correct, the Incompleteness Objection is to be interpreted more 
radically, as suggesting that the notion of forfeiture fails to perform even a limited justificatory 
role. The notion rather performs the different function of marking the fact that a justification 
of a certain type is present. 
The heuristic function performed by the notion of forfeiture is related to a second 
important role that the notion plays in the philosophical discussion on the justification of 
punishment and self-defence: forfeiture works as an intermediate conclusion in justificatory 
arguments that ground the permissibility of inflicting harm in suitably fundamental normative 
principles. It summarizes the result of a host of justificatory arguments that appeal to 
considerations such as fairness, reciprocity or responsibility in order to show why some people 
lack a complaint against being harmed in certain ways.  
If so, we might be tempted to conclude that the notion is superfluous and can be 
dispensed with, but this would be a mistake. The reason forfeiture is so pervasive in the debates 
we are considering is precisely that it is capable of functioning as an intermediate conclusion 
of this sort. By employing this notion we can discuss a number of important issues concerning 
the morality of punishment or self-defence, despite our disagreement about the more 
fundamental question of what justifies liability to punishment or defensive force. And we can 
do this precisely insofar as the notion works as a placeholder that summarizes the result of a 
number of underlying moral arguments. 
For example, we can discuss the difference between the treatments that should be 
reserved to Andy and to Carla in virtue of the fact that the former but not the latter lacks a right 
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not to be killed in self-defence; and we can do this despite the fact that we disagree about the 
question of why Andy lacks such a right. Different accounts of self-defence offer different 
explanations of the fact that Andy is liable to be killed, but these explanations will converge 
on the claim that Andy lacks a right not to be killed (and on the fact that this is why his situation 
is relevantly different from Carla’s). Being able to converge on this intermediate conclusion, 
without necessarily having to resort to more fundamental justificatory questions is important 
because it enables us to make progress in the discussion in the face of disagreement about such 
fundamental questions. 
 
IV. An objection 
An objection could be levelled against the view I am suggesting. The objection is that the sort 
of dilemma I have raised against forfeiture can be raised against a host of other moral notions 
which clearly do have justificatory force.19 Promising is an example. What is it that justifies 
the creation of promissory obligations? Faced with this question we could either appeal to one 
of the many principles offered in the literature, say the value of creating certain expectations,20 
or the interest we have in forming intimate relations with others (Shiffrin 2008) or in having 
practical authority over others (Owens 2012); or, alternatively, we might treat promissory 
obligations as basic features of morality and, like Hume, be puzzled by “one of the most 
mysterious and incomprehensible operations that can possibly be imagined, and may even be 
compared to transubstantiation or holy orders, where a certain form of words, along with a 
certain intention, changes entirely the nature of an external object, and even of a human 
creature.” 21 Either way, we will continue to believe (and rightly so) that when we promise to 
do X, what justifies our newly created duty to do X is the fact that we promised to do so. This 
conclusion is undermined neither by the thought that the justificatory force of promises can in 
turn be explained by appealing to some more fundamental normative principle, nor by the 
thought that promising is a basic principle with which we hit rock bottom in the justificatory 
process.  
The same holds for consent, a notion I have myself invoked as one that clearly does 
justificatory work.22 Whether we think that consent is a basic moral principle or that it is 
                                                          
19 Thanks to David Rodin and Kit Wellman for pressing this objection. 
20 The most prominent account of this kind is Scanlon’s “principle of fidelity” (Scanlon 1998). 
21 Hume (1739–40), 3.2.5–14/15–524; emphasis in the original 
22 See above, pp. 12-3. 
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grounded in some more fundamental principle (such as the interest we have in acting as 
autonomous moral agents or in having control over what happens to our body and our 
property), we will agree that when T consents to X (where X falls within the scope of what T 
can permissibly consent to), others (those to whom T gave consent) acquire a liberty to X and 
T loses her claim that others do not X. This conclusion is undermined neither by the thought 
that the justificatory force of consent can in turn be explained by appealing to further normative 
principles nor by the thought that consent is a basic normative principle. But if so, why worry 
about forfeiture? If the sort of dilemma I have considered does not undermine our belief that 
promises and consent do play a genuine justificatory role, why should it do so when raised 
against forfeiture? 
The answer is that notions such as promise and consent are very different from notions 
such as forfeiture and waiver. Indeed, not only do their structure and their modus operandi 
differ but, as I will explain, they operate at different levels within moral arguments. This is 
why noticing that the sort of dilemma I have presented does not threaten notions such as 
promise and consent is not enough to undermine the claim that the same dilemma is a problem 
for forfeiture.  
Promising and consenting are exercises of “normative powers”, by which we create or 
remove reasons for action that apply to us through an exercise of our will. While philosophers 
disagree as to what justifies the existence of these normative powers, it is generally recognized 
that their exercise does change our normative status by generating new obligations (in the case 
of promises) or by removing claim-rights we possess (in the case of consent).23 
Consider now the notion of waiver. Waiving a right does not constitute the exercise of 
normative power. Rather it is a way of describing how someone’s normative status changes 
when the agent exercises his or her normative power. This is why we can converge on the claim 
that someone has waived a certain right, even if we disagree about what justifies the waiving 
of the right. You might believe (correctly) that Elaine can permissibly drive Jerry’s car because 
Jerry has consented, whereas I might believe (mistakenly) that it is because Jerry has promised 
Elaine to lend her his car. Irrespective of who is right, 24 we are both correct in saying that Jerry 
                                                          
23 On the notion of normative powers, see Raz 1986, Watson 2009, Owens 2012. 
24 It might sound strange to say that you and I disagree when we claim that Elaine’s right to drive Jerry’s car is 
grounded in Jerry having consented or in Jerry having promised respectively. This is because colloquially the two 
notions are often used interchangeably. However, as we have seen, the logic of promises is different from the 
logic of consent: promises generate obligations for the promisor (and claim rights in the promisee), whereas 
consent removes one or more claim-rights possessed by the promisor (and creates new liberties for the promisees) 
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has waived his right. We are both correct in saying that, even if only one of us is correct about 
what ultimately justifies the change in Jerry’s normative status, precisely because when we say 
that Jerry has waived his right over his car we are not providing a justification for such a 
change. Rather, we are describing how Jerry’s normative status has changed as a consequence 
of the fact that he has exercised his normative power in a certain way. If the claim that Jerry 
has waived his right over his car played a justificatory role, we could not agree on that claim 
while disagreeing at the same time about what justifies his change in normative status.25 
The notion of forfeiture clearly is closer to the notion of waiver than to notions such as 
promising or consenting. I will not try here to articulate the exact difference between forfeiture 
and waiver, as this task is more complex than we might think at first. This is partly because 
their usage is not as uniform as one might hope.26 Typically, waiving a right is taken to be 
something that we do intentionally (we intend to bring about the relevant change in our 
normative status), whereas forfeiting a right is something that we normally do unintentionally 
(the change in our normative status is an unintended, though sometimes foreseen, consequence 
of our action). However, this is not always the case. We can imagine cases in which someone 
acts with the intention to forfeit certain rights (pressured to marry my boss’ daughter, I might 
decide to commit a crime with the intention of temporarily losing my right to liberty, so that I 
will be unable to marry her); and in criminal procedure, we can waive the right to avail 
ourselves to certain defenses by failing to comply with certain regulations, even if our failing 
to do so was not intentional. 
What matters for the purposes of this paper is that whatever the correct way to exactly 
characterize the difference between forfeiture and waiver is, they clearly seem to operate in the 
same way. More precisely, they operate at the same level within our justificatory arguments. 
                                                          
(Raz 1986, pp. 82-6; Hurd 1996; Owens 2012, pp. 164-72). Thus, although it is true that in consenting to dental 
treatment we normally also intend to commit to cooperate with the dentist, strictly speaking this does not have to 
be the case. After having consented you might leave town, thereby making it impossible for the dentist to treat 
you. In so doing, you do not wrong the dentist. However, you would have wronged the dentist if you had promised 
to let her treat you and then left. This is because consent involves no obligation to ensure that the person you 
consent to will be able to take advantage of your consent. (I borrow this example from Owens 2012, pp. 165-6).  
25 In this example, Jerry’s normative status has changed as a consequence of the fact that he has consented to 
Elaine using his car, but the same change would have been effected if Jerry had promised Elaine to let her drive 
his car. This is why you and I are both correct in claiming that Jerry has waived his right, despite the fact that I 
am mistaken about what justifies the loss of the right. 
26 For example, Kershnar 2002 unconventionally treats waiver as the broader category of which forfeiture is a 
species.  
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To see what I mean, let me identify four levels of discourse involved in the justification of 
claims such as “Elaine can permissibly drive Jerry’s car”, “Andy is liable to be killed by Beth 
in self-defence” or “Andy is liable to punishment”.  
Call the level at which we make these claims Level 4. Level 2 is the level where we 
find notions that do genuine justificatory work. Here we appeal to ideas such as consent or 
promises to explain why Elaine may drive Jerry’s car, or to notions such as fairness or moral 
contract to explain why Andy is liable to being punished. Level 1 is where we justify the 
principles operating at Level 2. Here we provide reasons to accept, for example, the claim that 
promises create new obligations for the promisors, or the claim that there is a moral contract 
requiring, among other things, that wrongdoers be liable to certain kinds of hard treatment. 
Level 3 is where we find notions such as waiver and forfeiture. These notions, as we have seen, 
do not add anything to the justificatory process. Rather, they are placeholders that summarize 
the result of the justificatory arguments operating at Level 2. Their main function is to signal 
that the normative status of an agent has changed in a particular way as a consequence of the 
fact that a justificatory story of a certain kind is available. 
The four levels could be thus represented: 
 
Level 4 “Elaine may permissibly drive 
Jerry’s car.” 
The claim to be justified. 
↓ 
Level 3 “Jerry has waived his right 
over the car.” 
Intermediate conclusion in the argument 
that grounds the claim at Level 4 on the 
justification provided at Level 2. 
↓ 
Level 2 “Jerry has promised Elaine to 
let her drive his car.” 
Justificatory argument for the claim at 
Level 4. 
↓ 
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Level 1 Principles such as Scanlon’s 
“principle of fidelity’ (Scanlon 
1998) or Owen’s “authority 
interest” (Owens 2012). 
 
Principles that explain why the justificatory 
argument at Level 2 has moral force. 
 
Or 
Level 4 “Andy is liable to be punished.” The claim to be justified. 
↓ 
Level 3 “Andy has forfeited his right 
not to be punished.” 
Intermediate conclusion in the argument 
that grounds the claim at Level 4 on the 
justification provided at Level 2. 
↓ 
Level 2 “Andy is bound by a 
hypothetical contract that 
renders wrongdoers liable to 
certain kinds of hard 
treatment.” 
Justificatory argument for the claim at 
Level 4. 
↓ 
Level 1 Justification of moral 
contractualism as instrumental 
to the promotion of individual 
self-interest (Gauthier 1986), as 
required by the need to justify 
ourselves to others (Scanlon 
1998), or on some other 
grounds. 
Principles that explain why the justificatory 
argument at Level 2 has moral force. 
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It should now be clear why noticing that the notions employed at Level 2 are not mere 
placeholders for the notions employed at Level 1 is not sufficient to conclude that the notions 
employed at Level 3 are not mere placeholders for the notions employed at Level 2. This is 
because the relationship between the different levels is not the same. The justificatory 
arguments at Level 2 explain why the normative status of the agent changes; but they can do 
so only because there is an underlying principle that, in turn, explains why the justificatory 
arguments offered at level 2 are sound. Thus, the notions invoked at Level 2 and the notions 
invoked at Level 1 both perform justificatory tasks, although different ones: the former justifies 
the claims made at Level 4, the latter justifies the principles invoked at Level 2. The same 
relationship does not exist between the notions employed at Level 3 and the notions operating 
at Level 2. If the arguments presented so far are convincing, the relationship between these two 
levels is different in kind from the one existing between the notions operating at Level 2 and 
those operating at Level 1.27 
 
V. Conclusion  
The language of forfeiture plays a crucial role in the philosophical discussion on the morality 
of harm, and particularly in debates on the justification of punishment and self-defence. The 
aim of this paper has been to clarify what this role is. I have suggested that forfeiture cannot 
provide a justification for liability to punishment or self-defence unless some other normative 
principle is invoked to explain why by acting in certain ways we alter our normative status and 
divest ourselves of certain moral rights. Thus, to the extent that forfeiture can be said to have 
any justificatory role, this role will be only derivative: saying that Andy has forfeited his right 
not to be punished or not to be killed can provide a justification for our liberty to punish or kill 
him only insofar as there is some underlying theory that appeals to substantive normative 
principles such as fairness, reciprocity or contractualism. 
 But once the relevant underlying principle is brought into the picture, we have reason 
to doubt that forfeiture can play even a limited justificatory role. For once we justify the right 
to punish or to inflict defensive harm on someone by appealing to said principle, there seems 
                                                          
27 Raz argues that assertions of rights are “typically intermediate conclusions in arguments from ultimate values 
to duties” (Raz 1986, p. 181). Despite the similarity in our formulations however, I do not take him to be claiming 
that the notion of rights operates as a mere placeholder operating at Level 3 for justificatory arguments to be found 
at Level 2. (If he is, I disagree, since I understand the notion of rights as one operating at Level 2, but I cannot 
address this issue here.) 
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to be no genuine justificatory role left to be played by the notion of forfeiture. In the same way 
in which once we know that Joe has consented to the risk of being punched by Ali, saying that 
he has waived his right not to be exposed to this risk adds nothing to the justification we have 
already provided, saying that Andy has forfeited his right not to be killed in self-defence by 
Beth adds nothing to the justification we provide when we appeal to the fact that he is under 
an enforceable duty to protect Beth’s life (Tadros 2012), or to the fact that Beth is under a duty 
of reciprocity not to attack Andy only insofar as he does not attack her (Rodin 2014). 
 I have suggested that the notion of forfeiture performs two related functions that pertain 
to the justification of punishment and self-defence, but are not themselves justificatory. First, 
the notion plays a heuristic role in marking the difference between two ways in which the 
permissibility of inflicting harm can be justified: cases where we are permitted to harm 
someone despite the fact that she has a right against being so harmed and cases where we are 
permitted to harm someone in virtue of the fact that she has lost such a right. When we say that 
Andy has forfeited his right not to be killed in self-defence by Beth we are pointing at the fact 
that the justification available to Beth for killing Andy is of the latter kind. This is important 
because, although killing might be permissible both in cases where the victim has forfeited her 
right not to be killed and in cases in which she hasn’t, in the latter cases (but not in the former) 
we are required to bear greater costs to avoid her death,  and special compensatory duties as 
well as duties to apologize are generated by the fact that the victim has been permissibly killed. 
The second role performed by forfeiture is closely connected to the first one. To the 
extent that the notion of forfeiture works like a placeholder, whose function is to signal that a 
justificatory story of a certain kind is available, it has an important pragmatic function: it allows 
us to discuss a number of issues concerning the morality of punishment or self-defence, without 
having to agree on the more fundamental question of what justifies liability to punishment or 
defensive force.  
The notion of forfeiture works as an intermediate step in justificatory arguments that 
ground the permissibility of inflicting harm by way of punishment or self-defence in 
considerations of fairness, reciprocity or responsibility. It summarizes the result of such 
arguments by spelling out an intermediate conclusion on which they all agree, namely that 
those who engage in wrongful conduct divest themselves of particular rights, and therefore lack 
a complaint against being harmed in certain ways.  
Being able to converge on this intermediate conclusion is of crucial importance because 
it enables us to discuss a number of important questions while bracketing any disagreement 
about the underlying justificatory arguments. If this is correct, the role of forfeiture, far from 
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being that of justifying punishment or self-defence, is ultimately to avoid talking about 
controversial aspects of their justification.
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